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ABSTRACT: There is a difference between the tasks of interpreting Sextus Empiricus and 
contesting his arguments. Usually, one does the latter relying on some version of the 
former. Though this seems obvious, it is easy to make mistakes in this endeavor. From this 
point, I draw two basic recommendations which we should follow, lest we take Sextus to 
hold implausible positions regarding his Five Modes. However, these recommendations 
lead us to interpret Sextus’ Pyrrhonism as a limited skepticism. In the final section, as I 
suggest a counter-example to this commitment, I reconsider the notion of infinite 
(apeiron) in the Five Modes to better explain interpretation and criticism of Sextus’ 
arguments.  
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There are two basic ways of approaching Sextus Empiricus’ works. The first features 
the effort of interpreting Sextus and mining his work for insights. What takes 
precedence is offering a coherent picture of Sextus’ writings. The second manner of 
approaching these works is to assume an interpretation of the writings and to either 
assess the cogency of Sextus’ arguments, or to contest them. One, in short, engages 
with Sextus for the sake of making an anti-skeptical argument. Sometimes an 
interchange between these two approaches can take place. Here, I wish to explore 
this mixed program. My aim is to offer something relevant for both realms of 
investigation by discussing a possible interchange between interpreting and 
contesting Sextus’ argumentation. Thus, in the first section, I discuss examples of 
these two manners of dealing with Sextus’ skeptical arguments. I extract two basic 
outcomes from these discussions. They are both centered in the Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism and concerned with the issue of the scope of the suspension of belief. I 
assume them as basic orientations for any efforts on interpretation of these works. 
In the second section I reassess these orientations, dealing with what oddly seems to 
be their implication, i.e., that the arguments in the Outlines are constrained to the 
context where they emerged. In the last section I focus on the Five Modes of 
suspension and propose that, with them, we can better understand both the 
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suggested constraints and why it is so difficult to offer an objection to Sextus if we 
accept as plausible these rules of interpretation.  
1. 
I begin with an important excerpt of the debate regarding the scope of suspension. I 
wish to promote two outcomes whose implications I further consider. Let me, first, 
explain, how the debate emerges. A Pyrrhonian skeptic is drawn to investigation in 
response to the disquiet she feels when facing anomalous appearances and conflicts 
of opinion. However, as the investigation proceeds, our investigator finds it hard to 
eliminate the conflicting character of what appears, or to reach a decision on how 
things really are. She bases her investigation on all the means available in her context 
to achieve this decision. As none of them proves successful to eliminate the 
undecidability, she has as a result, not as a conclusion, the suspension of her 
judgment. But what does the suspension of judgment concern? If we take belief as 
an answer, we become curious about the scope of this suspension. Does it make sense 
to say that she suspends judgment about all her beliefs? For, if we take beliefs to 
exert an important role in most of our daily activities, we immediately tend to hold 
a suspicious regard on the claim that the suspension is about all beliefs.  
This reasoning exemplifies how the scope of suspension becomes a problem 
when someone attempts to understand Pyrrhonian skepticism. To begin, there are 
two widely known interpretive positions of suspension. The first initially 
understands that suspension encompasses all  beliefs, as long as we can make sense 
of how a skeptic can achieve a detachment from herself by regarding the beliefs 
which occur in her as not hers. The second is that it is inevitable for the skeptic to 
hold beliefs, thereby restricting the scope of suspension to philosophical or 
theoretical commitments.1 These two positions are most famously represented by 
Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede, respectively. They, however, do not exhaust the 
logical space. 
More to the point, I’m addressing here the standpoint which Jonathan Barnes2 
proposes. In the problem of the scope, Barnes’s view calls for a cautionary regard, 
brought by a detailed analysis of the aspects surrounding the views offered by 
Burnyeat and Frede above. As Barnes understands the matter, the problem of the 
                                                        
1 Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede, eds., The Original Sceptics: a Controversy (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Hackett, 1998).  
2 Jonathan Barnes. “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist,” in The Original Sceptics: a Controversy, ed. Myles 
Burnyeat and Michael Frede (Indianapolis and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Hackett, 1998), 58-91.  
Boundless Skepticism and the Five Modes 
63 
scope might be unreal.3 He views the scope of suspension as varying from skeptic to 
skeptic, depending on what is anomalous for one, or what is disturbance for the 
other. Details such as these would calibrate the extent to which one’s judgment is 
suspended, and the presupposition of a general scope would be deemed implausible. 
This the first point on which I wish to expand. It is plausible to think that anomalies 
vary, along with the investigations which follow them and the suspensions obtained, 
delivering distinct scopes of commitments for skeptical reflection and, ultimately, 
suspension. The first outcome to be obtained here is that we should deem the object 
of suspension as something subjectively determined, dependent on the case of each 
skeptic and the anomalies she might face, thereby prompting investigation. I call this 
first outcome subjective constraints of investigation (from now on, SCI). Things may 
affect each one of us differently. We are, then, driven towards different anomalies 
and, by consequence, different investigations and suspensions. More specifically, 
what I am initially trying to say is that the proper comprehension of the object of 
suspension is dependent on the object of investigation and how it is determined. In 
the following sections I intend to show that this isn’t solely applicable to the matter 
of suspension.  
Meanwhile, it is fair to consider an initial reply to this view. According to it, 
regardless of the individual differences, there should be a way of distinguishing how 
suspension takes place, both in its scope and object. A proper analysis of belief and 
propositional attitude could afford us a general perspective on this. What this 
suggests is that we can comprehend the scope of suspension without resorting to any 
specificities about the skeptic and investigation. However, let me raise a few 
considerations in favor of Barnes’ position, something that delivers a second 
outcome. 
One consideration in favor of Barnes’ position is that, at the height of their 
debate about the scope, both Burnyeat and Frede make important amendments in 
their views. One of the main motivations was the concern that it should be wrong 
to rely on an anachronistic background when interpreting Sextus’ arguments. This 
was illustrated by Burnyeat’s discussion of the insulation view wrongly applied, for 
example, by Gassendi to Sextus.4 Could we say that Sextus saw first-order judgments 
as insulated from the philosophizing about them? Most probably, this view would 
                                                        
3 Barnes, “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist”, 89. 
4 Myles Burnyeat, “The Sceptic in his Place and Time”, in The Original Sceptics: a Controversy, 
ed. Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (Indianapolis and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Hackett, 
1998), 92. 
Allysson V.L. Rocha 
64 
not make sense for someone like Sextus, as the distinction is inserted in a different 
philosophical context. A similar point was made by Frede,5 when he distinguishes 
between dogmatic and classical skepticism. We must be aware, he emphasizes, that 
classical skeptics like Sextus are not to be seen as holding any position. We are to 
properly comprehend two different forms of assertion supposedly taken by the 
skeptic in addressing the possibility of knowledge.  
This excerpt of the debate concerning the scope of suspension provides us 
with a second consequence. But to obtain this result it is required to assume SCI 
above. For, as I understand the point shared by Burnyeat and Frede above, it lurks 
in the background of their respective revisions. This reflects, even if indirectly, the 
subjective constraints of investigation, though it does not imply the acceptance of 
Barnes’ view.6 Thus, the outcome is the following: any attempt of going beside the 
constraints of the context increases the risk of attributing to Sextus an anachronistic 
theoretical framework which is either foreign to his context, or something simply 
not considered by him.  
I call this second outcome the context constraint (from now on, CC), and I 
will assume it from now on, along with SCI. At the same time that they can bring us 
a clarifying view on the questions regarding suspension, they also suggest an 
interesting perspective on the skepticism described in Outlines. It appears that what 
prompts the skeptic towards the application of her dunamis antithetike comes from 
what theories are in conflict in the context where she is. More to the point, as Sextus 
himself acknowledges, the concern is with “the unclear things being investigated by 
the Sciences” (PH 1.13). Hence, if the object and scope of suspension is something 
subjectively determined, a lot will depend on the unclear things under investigation 
which feature in the skeptic’s context. Again, it is a contentious matter if we should 
or should not embrace the subjective view of the scope and object of suspension, 
although it seems plausible to concede the subjective constraint of investigation. But, 
regardless of how the discussion unfolds in the first point, I think it is fair to say that 
we should, at least, initially acknowledge that we must be careful and avow SCI and 
CC in our interpretations of how far the suspension goes and its object. In the next 
section I begin to explore the consequences of assuming this position in the outset. 
                                                        
5 Michael Frede, “The Sceptic’s Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of 
Knowledge”, in The Original Sceptics: a Controversy, ed. Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede 
(Indianapolis and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Hackett, 1998), 128. 
6   I mention this because Burnyeat, for example, acknowledges his chapter as a response to Barnes’ 
points. Cf. Myles Burnyeat, “The Sceptic in his Place and Time”, no. 13, 97. 
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2. 
I began the last section with a description of the skeptic in her efforts to address 
anomalies of appearances and wide disagreement. I understand that the many 
different difficulties she faces along the way could be seen as manifested in the 
diversity of the familiar skeptical modes. But some stage-setting is required for a due 
explanation of what I mean by the modes and what difficulties they represent. 
According to Sextus in PH 1.31, the application of the skill which defines the skeptic 
precedes the modes, that is, it could be seen as a general mode based on the ability 
to “oppose what appears to what appears, or what is thought of to what is thought 
of, or crosswise.” Moreover, this skill is manifested when the skeptic faces “some 
unclear object of investigation” (PH 1.13), something to which the skeptic soon 
demonstrates unsurmountable difficulties for justified assent. Obviously, there are 
different oppositions depending on the object of assent which is presented and the 
things to be opposed. To show how Sextus makes this clear, first, I wish to explore 
how the oppositions led to different modes in response to the constraints of the 
context and the investigation. Here, I show how CC and SCI above work in 
association with two of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus. Later, I turn my attention 
to the Five Modes in order to explore a similar dynamics. My aim is to understand if 
the constraint of the context could represent a limitation for the modes, that is, if 
they would lose their force when considered in a different context from which they 
originally emerged. I explore this matter through purported counter-examples to 
CC. As none of them holds, CC and SCI yield the conclusion that the modes have a 
limited scope of application. But what I initially argue in this section is that this is 
not a limited skepticism, but, as most skepticisms are, a consideration of our 
limitations. I better explain the point in the final section. 
Returning to CC, the proposal is to explore the context constraint in the 
formulation of the modes. My hypothesis is that, if we should not apply any foreign 
theory to Sextus’ views, we should see that Sextus consistently indexes suspension 
to subjects and their particular inquiries. For it is plausible to think that Sextus, and 
the reported creators of the modes, Agrippa and Aenesidemus, were not accessing 
some atemporal and decontextualized source when conceiving their formulation. 
The ability to oppose objects of perception or objects of thought, for example, could 
already be seen as a heritage from the sophists and their techniques of argumentation 
(see Protagoras fragment A1, and Gorgias fragment A1a). These skeptics 
particularized these strategies. In order to better explain my point, I turn to two 
passages. In the first, Sextus specifies that “what we investigate is not what is 
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apparent but what is said about what is apparent” (PH 1.19-20), and further he 
explains that in the case of arguments directed against what is apparent, the skeptic 
is using them as a way of countering the rashness of the Dogmatists. Further, in a 
second passage, Sextus clarifies that “when I say ‘Opposed to every account there is 
an equal account,’ I am implicitly saying this: ‘to every account I have scrutinized 
(…) there appears to me to be opposed another account (...)’” (PH 1.203). In 
association with CC, these passages afford the interpretation already mentioned 
above, i.e., the oppositions are set in accordance to what the skeptic scrutinizes or 
receives as an account. The important addition is the subjective perspective 
emphasized by the passage, for the opposition is raised “to every account I have 
scrutinized.” Such example reinforces the plausibility of SCI, since Sextus has 
explicitly restricted the modes to the investigations he has undertaken. Now, if the 
modes begin from these oppositions, it is plausible to expect them to be structured 
from the accounts with which the skeptic has had contact, that is, the particular 
theories. I proceed to show this in two of the Ten Modes of Aenesedimus.  
At PH 1.46, while displaying the modes based on the difference among 
animals and the supposed conflict among our sense organs, Sextus comes with the 
following line: “it is surely far more reasonable, given that animals’ eyes contain 
mixtures of different humors, that they should also get different appearances from 
existing objects”. Thus, based on an investigation concerning what is apparently said 
in these fields, Sextus achieves a situation where to tell how an existing object really 
is becomes something undecidable. After all, according to theories in his context, 
different humors could prompt different perceptions of the object. How are we to 
decide which is the correct one? 
However, observe that Sextus is forging the premisses of his argumentation 
from an outmoded theory about the physiology of living beings. Would this be 
enough for us to raise some doubts about it, or even to dismiss this as a skeptical 
consideration concerning our perception? This is what following CC and SCI would 
recommend. As these modes were composed assuming specific theories of 
physiology and perception, they should represent a skeptical threat only for those 
who take this theoretical framework to explain how we perceive the world. As these 
theories are not the basis for explaining sense perception today, the two modes no 
longer represent a skeptical threat and we would be entitled to dismiss them as such. 
Maybe, these can be considered, pace Sextus (PH 1.35), as the modes to be deemed 
unsound, if the outdated background truly compromises the scope of both.  
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Let me make this point in a different way, one which is relevant to what 
follows next. Imagine that we give ourselves the task of continuing this skeptical 
tradition nowadays and of updating effectively these two modes. To do this, in 
accordance with what Sextus presents in the Outlines, the first thing to be done is 
to conduct an investigation to the point of better manipulating the concepts in 
today’s science. This is not the simple case where I have to spot disagreement among 
scientists on the matter of perception to attain undecidability and, as a consequence, 
suspension of judgement. The case is that I should investigate how cognitive science 
explains visual phenomena, for example, in order to demonstrate how color 
perception works and, then, reenact the mode similarly to what is presented above, 
if possible. At this point, then, someone would be able to properly structure an 
opposition between different episodes of cognitive perception from the standpoint 
of a certain theory.  
This might yield the conclusion that the skeptic has to be an expert in a certain 
area of investigation in order to duly apply the dunamis antithetike. This sounds odd, 
at first, and in need of clarification. As I understand, only by considering the same 
problems in the context of the Five Modes can we comprehend what is at stake in 
this case. So far, I think it is plausible to conclude that, if we accept CC, these two 
modes don’t hold as a means to identify undecidability on matters of perception. To 
put the matter differently, if CC guides us in interpreting these two modes, we may 
consider them as restrained for those who defended the four humors theory, and 
should not represent a concern today.  
Thus, could we say that the Five Modes fall prey to the same problems which 
I addressed above, concerning two of the other ten modes? A first look on the matter 
may lead us to the conclusion that it does. I mentioned above that the raising of 
opposing arguments can be traced back to the well-known technique of the sophists. 
In the case of the Five Modes, something similar could be said. 
Peter Klein,7 for example, holds that, in the Five Modes, Sextus has his 
reasoning guided by an Aristotelian view on how someone should bring forth a proof 
to decide something. Again, there should be no surprise here. Sextus himself, in the 
opening of PH, claims to be addressing Aristotle as someone among the dogmatists. 
And the demand for a “point from which to begin to establish something” (PH 1.166) 
in the ad infinitum mode surely reminds us of Aristotle’s formulation of his regress 
                                                        
7 Peter Klein, “Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism”, in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, 
Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Diego E. Machuca (New York: Springer, 2011), 79-
96.  
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argument in Posterior Analytics (72b5-18 and 72b25-28). Could these remarks allow 
us to say that this is the constraint on the Five Modes? Klein8 argues for the existence 
of this constraint, in tandem with what I just explored in the case of the two modes 
above. Only for someone who endorses important features of Aristotle’s view on the 
matter could the Five Modes represent a problem. I explore this line of reasoning in 
connection with what I have already discussed so far.  
I’m trying to relate this line of reasoning offered by Klein to the issues I have 
explored so far, concerned with CC and SCI. Thus, it is plausible to imagine Sextus 
scrutinizing the writings of Aristotle. More specifically, on one hand there are 
remarks such as “what is brought forward as a source of convictions for the matter 
proposed itself needs another such source, which itself needs another, and so ad 
infinitum” made by Sextus at PH 1.166. On the other hand, there is something like 
“we are led back ad infinitum on the ground that we shall not understand because 
of the prior items if there are no primitives” issued by Aristotle at Posterior Analytics 
72b5. A similar connection can be drawn in the case of the reciprocal mode at PH 
1.169, where an object investigated is advanced as a support for the object 
investigated. Aristotle equally condemns this reasoning when he says that “it is 
impossible for the same thing at the same time to be both prior and posterior to 
something” at 72b25. Obviously, both authors part ways when considering the point 
from which demonstration begins, supposedly responsible for helping us in avoiding 
regresses and circles. Aristotle offers a thorough theory to explain where the regress 
ends. But Sextus holds, at some point, this is something merely assumed and so not 
justified per se (PH 1.168).  
I won’t enter into the details of Aristotle’s theory in order to evaluate if Sextus’ 
argumentation holds against it. My point is that Klein reasonably draws from these 
connections interesting consequences which I relate to CC and SCI. The first one is 
that, in accordance with Aristotle, Sextus does not occupy himself with explaining 
or arguing why regresses and circles are bad.9 He takes it from Aristotle. Second, this 
is explained because Sextus structured these modes from within the Aristotelian 
background. He is arguing internal to the perspectives of those who hold that 
knowledge is possible. Finally, this explains why he dedicates more attention to 
show why there isn’t the point of start or foundations which Aristotle claims to exist. 
Even though Sextus does not cite Aristotle's theory explicitly while displaying his 
arguments, the connection would be clear to any well-trained philosopher of the 
                                                        
8 Klein, “Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism”, 91. 
9 Klein, “Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism”, 85. 
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period. From these connections, Klein derives the already mentioned conclusion: 
Sextus comes up with a puzzle for those who endorse the Aristotelian view of 
knowledge’s structure. Now, I think it is explicit that the modes are placed in the 
context where Sextus elaborated his writings. CC, then, is vindicated, and we see 
reason for us to interpret Sextus in line with SCI, since the line of argument bears 
on the theories subjectively available to those who are seeking knowledge or 
investigating.  
However, the issue which is most problematic in this example is the further 
step taken by Klein. He reasons that, as Sextus doesn’t take in consideration theories 
which appeal to circular reasoning or infinity regresses, the modes above described 
could not represent a problem for those who espouse these two views. Put 
differently, Sextus’ skepticism would be limited. The previous examples may also 
entitle one to say that this is the result we get from subscribing to CC and SCI. 
However, I understand that, once the so called limitation is properly understood, it 
becomes more of a triumph for Pyrrhonism than a problem for the program.  
A proper comprehension of this limitation begins with an attempt to criticize 
Klein’s line of argument, along with CC and SCI. To do this, I propose that we 
imagine a framework that would not be dialectically dependent on Aristotle’s 
epistemology. This different theoretical arrangement would encompass different 
principles which, by their turn, would dislodge the platform from which the Five 
Modes once were raised. However, the problem is that, as we turn our attention to 
the basic constituents of any framework, Pyrrhonism no longer seems limited as 
Klein takes it to be. 
I think it is not a controversial claim to say that a common characteristic to 
every framework is that they are composed by principles. These are the basic 
constituents which help shaping the theoretical arrangement. The point made by 
Klein, then, is that Sextus is drawing the Five Modes from a framework built through 
Aristotelian principles. The most crucial among them suggests that it doesn’t matter 
how much longer you can go by executing inferences. If the starting point does not 
possess a special feature, you gain nothing by making more inductions. Thus, this 
strategy recommends the following: come up with principles which do not carry this 
view, and the Five Modes will no longer be a skeptical problem.  
Nevertheless, we still begin from principles and, here, Sextus may pose a very 
simple question which can explain why the Five Modes are not constrained as the 
argumentation so far wants us to conclude. And the following point does not require 
that we resort to the specificities of an assumed framework. The reason is that 
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principles possess a very basic characteristic: they instruct us in how to proceed 
when doing something. And, as such, they must inform us of a very simple thing, 
that is, a place from where we start. With this, the basic question which Sextus 
would offer is the following: what makes this starting point a good one? 
I must explain why I think this would be the appropriate question and what 
it means. I shall say that I’m not resorting now to a problem of the criterion, that is, 
I’m not saying that Sextus is questioning the principle itself (although it is defensible 
to state that the problem of the criterion reenacts the puzzle offered by the Five 
Modes10). But, let’s follow what seems to be the skeptic’s modus operandi and see if 
a change in the principle delivers another framework, one that does not allow the 
puzzle of the Five Modes to take off.  
So, suppose we abandon the requirement of a privileged starting point and 
attribute to justifying inference a different status, one which can be sustained 
regardless of the beginning of the chain of inferences. Thus, it is the way the 
inferences are made which counts now, not from where they began. In better terms, 
what matters now is the performance of the person and not the place from which 
she started. The problem, though, is that the person following these instructions 
could always conceive of a better performance, one which excels the previous 
obtained, and so on. It will look as if the present performance was never good 
enough, rendering the utmost level of performance something indefinite. Thus, it 
appears that the mode ad infinitum has its grip also in this new framework. 
A different way of posing the same problem is by imagining that the 
conditions under which the inferences are made could always be improved. The 
reasoning follows again. We lost the track of the best conditions under which the 
performance would be optimal. As a step further seems always possible, it becomes 
indefinite where to draw a line. Observe that a kind of limitation emerges now. It is 
related to a normative ambiance, where the puzzle is to properly establish where the 
optimal performance lies. It is also a concern with the ought-implies-can relation, 
that is, what if the optimal performance is to outstrip our cognitive abilities? Thus, 
contrary to what was previously stated, it is not that Pyrrhonism is limited. Rather, 
as most forms of skepticism, it reveals our limitations. I try to better explain this in 
the next section.  
                                                        
10. Cf. Andrew Cling, “Reasons, Regresses, and Tragedy: the Epistemic Regress Problem and the 
Problem of the Criterion”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 46, No. 4 (October 2009): 333-
346. 
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3. 
In the very beginning, I mentioned two basic approaches to the works of Sextus 
Empiricus. One may try to interpret his writings in an effort to discern a coherent 
view of the arguments he presents. Alternately, one may try to articulate an analysis 
of these arguments, but with the intent of showing where Sextus errs—so, for the 
sake of producing anti-skeptical results. The latter depends on the former; that is, in 
order to say that Sextus is wrong, one has to rely on an interpretation of the writings. 
In the previous section, I offered an example of how this interchange might work. 
The example was relevant for two reasons. First, because it follows closely the two 
outcomes observed in the first section. Second, because it drives us towards the 
center of the matter which I wish to fully explore now. 
The main issue is to explain what is wrong with the claim that Pyrrhonian 
skepticism is limited. It is true that, by following CC and SCI, we reach the view that 
the Five Modes very much reenact the Aristotelian standards to accomplish a 
successful proof. However, as the counter-example above illustrated, it does not 
follow that these modes are innocuous for any theory formulated from a different 
background. A plausible explanation for this might be found in a passage where 
Sextus makes comments about the Five Modes.  
Sextus pauses in Outlines to address the scope of the Five Modes, offering an 
explanation which could help us understand why Pyrrhonism is, in fact, not limited. 
Sextus notes “that every object of investigation can be referred to these modes” (PH 
1.169). To explain how, from PH 1.170 until PH 1.177, Sextus argues for a pattern of 
interaction among the modes. First, the modes of dispute and relativity describe the 
terrain of controversy which tends to prompt investigation, regardless of the matter 
investigated, that is, be it an object of perception or an object of thought. For, as the 
controversy persists, the possibility of its resolution seems to dim, and the suspension 
of judgement becomes the inevitable result. At PH 1.171-174, we can observe the 
three formal modes (Agrippa’s Trilemma) arising as exploring what follows from the 
attempts to eliminate dispute and relativity regarding the matter investigated. For if 
I state that p is the correct view, I shall offer a proof in favor of it. If the proof solely 
reinstates the object investigated, I display a circular reasoning which offers no 
conclusion. And If I simply state p without proof, nothing gets in the way of 
someone else doing the same. I’m, then, back to the differences which nurture 
dispute and relativity. I may still opt for the continuity of investigation. However, 
as I manage to avoid the problems just mentioned, I drive myself towards an infinite 
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sequence of proofs. This means only that no conclusion is obtained, and suspension 
of judgement becomes the inevitable result.  
So, it seems that Pyrrhonian skepticism is not limited, because the Five Modes 
encompass any object of investigation, regardless of the background. However, a 
puzzling detail emerges in a comparison between two excerpts, one just cited and 
another one discussed in the last section. At first, they seem to yield conflicting 
views. But a plausible interpretation can eliminate this first impression. First, recall 
the evidence in favor of CC and SCI. At PH 1.202, Sextus is concerned about the 
scope of ‘every’ in the “the chief constitutive principle of scepticism” presented at 
PH 1.12, that is, “that to every account an equal account is opposed.” As shown, the 
‘every’ concerns particularly the accounts the skeptic has inspected. Similar points 
are made at PH 1.198 and 1.200. However, an equal constraint is not imposed on the 
‘every’ which features at PH 1.169, i.e., the one just mentioned in the last paragraph. 
Someone may say that at PH 1.202 and 1.12, when Sextus is concerned with 
opposing accounts, he is indirectly approaching the mode from dispute. For, in this 
mode, he opposes conflicting views and, as explained in these passages, these would 
only be the views he had scrutinized. But notice that in this case he refers to every 
view concerning an object of investigation. While the ‘every’ I am focused on is 
related to objects of investigation. Thus, oddly, the scope of his affirmation would 
encompass objects of investigation emerged in his inquiry, in the inquiries before his 
and in those yet to come. In the end, it looks as if the Five Modes are an exception 
to CC and SCI. 
However, to exempt them from these constraints won’t bring good results, 
especially in terms of trying to structure a coherent view of Sextus’ skepticism. First, 
this would put Sextus in a position to say that “regardless of the matter investigated, 
the result will always be the same: suspension of judgment.” Some could say that this 
is exactly what this skeptic is trying to tell us, thereby explaining why the Five 
Modes represent a skeptical challenge. But a second point must be made before such 
conclusion. Recall that at PH 1.1-3 Sextus qualifies the skeptic as the one who is still 
investigating. Now, if every object of investigation can be referred to the Five Modes, 
it surely becomes difficult to explain why the skeptic would be still investigating as 
the result is already known—that is, that the matter will not be resolved, and the 
skeptic must suspend judgment. But a few more passages may clarify why the inquiry 
persists. 
First, we should remember that, at PH 1.12, Sextus explains what prompts the 
“men of talent” to investigation. It is “the anomaly in things” which troubles and 
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puzzles them. Deciding these matters (believing) would put these inquirers in a 
tranquil state of mind. Moreover, it is useful to remind ourselves that, following this 
passage, at PH 1.13, Sextus notes that appearances can force feelings upon the 
skeptics, constraining them to assent, that “the skeptic gives assent to the feelings 
which are the necessary results of sense impressions.” What I wish to highlight with 
these two passages is that, even if I’m aware that every object of investigation can be 
brought under the Five Modes, the skeptic and those who seek knowledge can’t help 
feeling troubled by anomalies in appearances here and there. Thus, anyone who has 
sense perception would inevitably put themselves back in the path of investigation 
to recover their formerly tranquil state of mind, even if they were aware that their 
efforts would lead them towards the puzzlement of the Five Modes.  
This way of eliminating the inconsistency may raise problems for Sextus. For, 
as Katja Vogt11 explains, this would allow one to say that the skeptic is not really 
engaged in finding or even pursuing the truth. Rather, Sextus would be concerned 
solely with the tranquility of the soul, and not with genuine investigation. However, 
as Vogt herself reminds us, a lot depends on how one conceives investigation. If 
investigation is an endeavor which aims at the discovering truths, the charge 
becomes plausible. But, if investigation is taken as an activity which responds, 
through its norms, to the value of truth, then the accusation doesn’t follow so 
straightforwardly. For now the skeptic may claim that she hasn’t found the truth, 
because all the means available weren’t appropriate to do so. Suspension of judgment 
follows out of a respect for the value of truth, not attainable in the present moment. 
In a few passages, Sextus gives us reasons to hold to this interpretation. At PH 2.11, 
for example, when also discussing the feasibility of the skeptic’s investigation, he 
indicates “the reason why any investigation is undertaken” is that the inquirers don’t 
know the real nature of the objects, and they haven’t found no answer to this 
question. Besides, at PH 1.25, Sextus explains that the tranquility of the soul purports 
to be found as soon as the skeptic is able to discern the truth or falsity of the 
appearances. Thus, suspension of judgment is only one of the paths towards a 
tranquil soul, followed solely under circumstances where the other options fall short 
of success. One is a skeptic precisely because one is a genuine inquirer, one who 
values truth and pursues it. 
                                                        
11. Katja Maria Vogt, “The Aims of Skeptical Investigation”, in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, 
and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Diego E. Machuca (New York: Springer, 2011), 33. This whole 
chapter offers more on the matter of investigation in Pyrrhonian skepticism than I can do at the 
present opportunity. 
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It seems, then, we have a plausible explanation for why the skeptic truly keeps 
investigating (as noted at PH 1.4), despite every object of investigation being 
captured in the Five Modes. It seems also that we achieved a good explanation of 
why Pyrrhonian skepticism is not limited in the way a purely dialectical 
interpretation would have it. But, still, this picture yields an incoherent view of the 
skeptic behavior, for we see someone who constantly begins a fight he knows he will 
lose, someone who takes on a task she can never complete. That is why I think now 
is the time to consider what exactly are the limitations Sextus addresses in his 
arguments. I think three basic points are helpful to understand this issue. First, it is 
wrong to say that Sextus is beginning a fight he knows he is going to lose. I’m afraid 
it is obvious now that he is simply entering an investigation. And, as with any 
investigation, he doesn’t know where it is going to lead him. Otherwise, he wouldn’t 
investigate, for he already knew the result.  
Second, it is important to remember how Sextus broadly describes an object 
of investigation: “what we investigate is (…) what is said about what is apparent” 
(PH 1.19-20). I bring this quote once again in order to address an obvious similarity. 
Both the interpreter of Sextus and anyone disputing his arguments are also 
investigating what is said about something, be it apparent or not. Though it is an 
obvious point, it suffices to remind that the interpreter and the critic also have their 
objects of investigation under the scope of the Five Modes. A similar situation leads 
to a similar predicament. They might not be engaged in a lost battle, but the success 
of their investigation is heavily dependent on how they manage to deal with the 
modes of Agrippa. Because of that, suspension of judgment seems in the offing for 
them too.  
Third and finally, it is also relevant to observe that, for example, maybe Klein 
sees the regress differently from Sextus. After all, these are two different inquirers 
who conducted investigations starting from different backgrounds, that is, the 
meaning of infinity in the mode ad infinitum might be differently seen by each 
investigator. It appears to me that Klein is more concerned with a flat-out infinity, 
a determined quantity, as it usually happens in the debate nowadays. However, 
Sextus seems to refer to something slightly but importantly distinct, once he uses the 
word apeiron which is more closely related to the boundlessness, the undetermined. 
It is hard to take this word as standing for the flat-out infinity expressed by Klein. It 
appears to be something more in the spirit of the skeptical posture defended by 
Sextus, whence he would not determine the existence of something ungraspable as 
an infinite length of proofs. Rather, he seems to indicate a non-conclusive situation, 
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associated with the boundlessness of his reasoning, from which would emerge 
aporia. 
I concede it is not entirely clear the precise meaning of apeiron in this context. 
But I believe that what this reading of infinity suggests should not be confined to 
the Outlines. For it seems to deliver a common situation among the three 
investigations here analyzed: Sextus’, the interpreter’s and the disputant’s. As Sextus 
argues at PH 1.85, the differences among our intellects are boundless as well. So, at 
each of these cases one comes from different backgrounds and one tends to see 
matters differently. An attempt to decide the correct one inevitably puts us in the 
route of boundlessness again, this time through the Five Modes. Thus, we are left 
with no starting point for our argument. And, even if we are free to start regardless 
of this, there does not seem to exist a conclusive and non-provisional point to 
interrupt our reasoning. Apparently, we are unable to escape the difficulties in 
which Sextus claimed to be. And there is nothing left to do but trying to understand 
how to deal with them, that is, keeping with the investigation.12 
                                                        
12 I thank all the participants of the Ancient Epistemology Workshop at Vanderbilt University for 
all their helpful comments and questions. I also have to thank the Fulbright Commission in Brazil, 
as well as the staff in the U.S., for allowing me to have this fantastic experience abroad, and CAPES, 
for the same support throughout my doctorate in Brazil. 
